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MARKETS, MORALS, AND THE MAINTENANCE
OF GOVERNMENT
Laura S. Underkuffler*
It is accepted as a seeming truism that corruption and regime change
usually go hand-in-hand. Indeed, links between corruption, political in-
stability, and regime change have been drawn by many observers.1 The
relationship between corruption and regime change is often described in
almost symbiotic terms. Corruption provokes regime change and then,
once political upheaval begins, corruption increases as the institutions
that might control corruption are themselves victims of the resulting po-
litical turmoil.2
The reasons why corruption can provoke regime change are obvi-
ous. Corruption is associated with illegality, grasping, and the secret en-
richment of some at the expense of others. If such actions are believed to
characterize government officials, public outrage can set afire previously
simmering economic and social dissatisfactions.
The reasons for an increase in corruption as regime change gains
momentum are more opaque. Even if the ultimate governmental outcome
includes reforms that are classically associated with less corrupt, demo-
cratic governments-such as the adoption of a free press, an independent
judiciary, less bureaucratic discretion, and greater transparency in gov-
* J. DuPratt White Professor of Law, Cornell Law School.
1 See, e.g., Robert B. Charlick, Corruption in Political Transition: A Governance Per-
spective, 7 CORRUPTION AND REFORM: AN INT'L J. 177 (1993); Kimberly A. Elliott, Corrup-
tion as an International Policy Problem: Overview and Recommendations, in CORRUPTION &
GLOB. ECON. 175, 198 (Kimberly A. Elliott ed., 1997); Patrick Glynn, Stephen J. Kobrin &
Moises Naim, The Globalization of Corruption, in CORRUPTION & GLOB. ECON 7, 8-10. Partic-
ular case studies that have supported this linkage have involved countries in Latin America,
Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, Sierra Leone, Mozambique, Burundi, Uganda, and
the former Zaire. See, e.g., Steve Askin & Carole Collins, External Collusion with
Kleptocracy: Can Zaire Recapture Its Stolen Wealth?, 57 REv. AFR. POL. ECON. 72 (1993);
Glynn et al. supra, at 10; Daniel Kaufmann, Revisiting Anti-Corruption Strategies: Tilt To-
wards Incentive-Driven Approaches?, in UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME & OECD DEV.
CENTRE, CORRUPTION & INTEGRITY IMPROVEMENT INITIATIVES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIEs 63,
75 (1998); Quentin Reed, Dysfunctionality and Change in the Czech and Slovak Republics, 22
CRIME, L. AND SOC. CHANGE 323, 326-31 (1994); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Corruption in the
Wake of Domestic Conflict, in CORRUPTION, GLOB. SEC. & WORLD ORDER 66, 71, 76-82 (Rob-
ert I. Rotberg ed., 2009); Augustine Ruzindana, The Importance of Leadership in Fighting
Corruption in Uganda, in CORRUPTION & GLOB. ECON., 133, 134-36 (Kimberly A. Elliott ed.,
1997); David Stasavage, Causes and Consequences of Corruption: Mozambique in Transition,
in CORRUPTION & DEMOCRATISATION 65, 65 (Alan Doig & Robin Theobald eds., 2000).
2 See Elliott, supra note 1, at 198; Glynn et al., supra note 1, at 8-10.
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ernment-an increase in corruption during the transitionary period is
rarely avoided. It seems that in order to reduce corruption, societies must
often go through a period of increased corruption. It is a seeming
paradox.
Commentators generally offer explanations that are associated with
the upheaval of regime change itself. For instance, during a time of
(often violent) regime change, political and legal institutions that have
provided some modicum of protection against corruption and the ex-
ploitation of power might fail. New institutions, even if theoretically su-
perior, might go unfunded as revenue collection is suspended. In other
words, even corrupt regimes generally exert some control over lawless-
ness. With the removal of authoritarian controls, there can be an explo-
sion of corrupt behavior just as there can be riots in the streets.
Such theories undoubtedly identify important factors. However, in
this Article I will advance a different thesis. Corruption, I will argue,
is-most essentially-a moral phenomenon. Whether a society is riddled
with corruption will be directly related to the degree to which citizens
have internalized norms of self-restraint (or "moral") norms. Although it
is conceivable that governmental upheaval will-out of the starting
gate-strengthen moral standards, it is more likely that it will be accom-
panied by social upheaval and the destabilization of pre-existing norms.
In addition, when regime change includes movement toward a market
economy, this can be a decidedly aggravating factor. This is because
there are intrinsic characteristics of a market model that encourage a cor-
rupt ethos.
Finally, I shall argue that these dynamics illustrate a deeper and
broader truth, which extends beyond the particular situation of regime
change and the recent adoption of market-based, capitalistic reforms. We
often seem to assume that certain "process" or "structural" guarantees-
such as popular voting and the maintenance of a market economy-will
provide what is necessary for the creation and maintenance of a liberal
democracy. In fact, focus on corruption's growth during times of demo-
cratic regime change and the transition to a market-based economic sys-
tem illustrate the fallacy of this claim. Corruption-and its relation to
moral values-illustrates that far more is needed to sustain what we con-
sider to be an acceptable liberal democratic order.
I. THE NATURE OF CORRUPTION, AND ITS MEANING
FOR GOVERNMENT
To develop the thesis that this Article presents, we must begin with
what corruption is, and its meaning for government.
Corruption is an incredibly powerful idea in popular and academic
writing. Corruption is a word that carries immediate meaning, and its
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mere mention has immense stigmatic power. As I have previously writ-
ten, "[c]harges of corruption in public life have condemned men, de-
stroyed the lives of women, and accelerated the decline and fall of
governments. Corruption is something that human beings instinctively
loathe, and that we try to excise from our midst. The word itself conjures
something that is powerful, insidious, and destructive of human lives and
institutions.' 3
The word is odd, however, in that its precise meaning-despite our
visceral certainty of it-is elusive. In the governmental context, some
have posited that it means a violation of law. 4 This is often coupled with
the idea that the illegal act is for private gain.5 Others have asserted that
corruption by government officials involves a breach of duty, in particu-
lar, the breach of a public duty that the government official was sworn to
uphold. 6 Still others describe governmental corruption as "involv[ing]
the subversion of the public interest ' 7 or as a general "abuse of power." 8
Although the characteristics that these definitions stress are often
associated with corrupt acts, "corruption"-as we commonly understand
it-involves more. An act can be illegal, or in breach of a public duty, or
involve a subversion of the public interest, and that characteristic will
not-standing alone-render that act "corrupt." There is more to the idea
of corruption, something that triggers the deep, visceral response that the
3 LAURA S. UNDERKUFFLER, CAPTURED BY Eviw: THE MEANING OF CORRUPTION IN LAW
1 (2013).
4 See, e.g., SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT: CAUSES, CONSE
QUENCES, AND REFORM 9 (1999) ("Payments are corrupt if they are illegally made to public
agents with the goal of obtaining a benefit or avoiding a cost"); MICHAEL JOHNSTON, POLITI-
CAL CORRUPTION AND PUBLIC POLICY IN AMERICA 8 (1982) ("Corruption is abuse of a public
role for private benefit in such a way as to break the law (or other formal administrative
regulations . . . ).") (emphasis deleted).
5 See, e.g., JOHNSTON, supra note 4.
6 See, e.g., David H. Bayley, The Effects of Corruption in a Developing Nation, in
POLITICAL CORRUPTION: READINGS IN COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 521, 522 (Arnold J. Heiden-
heimer ed., 1978) (describing corruption as "the misuse of authority"); Arnold J. Heiden-
heimer, The Context of Analysis, in POLITICAL CORRUPTION: READINGS IN COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS at 3, 4 Arnold J. Heidenheimer ed., 1978) (describing corruption as the "lack of
integrity in the discharge of public duties"); J. S. Nye, Corruption and Political Development:
A Cost-Benefit Analysis, in 61 AM. POL. ScI. REv. 417,419 (1967); Morris Szeftel, Corruption
and the Spoils System in Zambia, in CORRUPTION: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND CONTROL
163, 165 (Michael Clarke ed., 1983) (calling corruption the deviation from the "formal duties"
of a public role).
7 Robert Williams, Corruption: New Concepts for Old?, in 20 THIRD WORLD Q. 503,
505 (1999). See also Robert C. Brooks, Apologies for Political Corruption, in POLITICAL COR-
RUPTION: READINGS IN COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS, supra note 6, at 501, 507 ("The very essence
of corruption is self-interest regardless of public interest.").
8 See, e.g., Franklin E. Zimring & David T. Johnson, On the Comparative Study of
Corruption, 45 BRrr. J. CRIMINOLOGY 793, 807 (2005); Peter Csonka, Corruption: The Coun-
cil of Europe's Approach, in CORRUPTION: THE ENEMY WrrHN 343, 350 (Barry Rider ed.,
1997).
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word "corruption" conveys. Corruption, as an idea, denotes shame; 9 it
denotes depravity; 10 it signals something that is dangerous or rotten to
the core. 1
What is missing from understandings that draw upon illegality,
breach-of-duty, and other neutral concepts-and which is captured by
more impassioned characterizations-is that corruption is a deeply moral
notion. Some contemporary commentators recognize this, and state flatly
that political corruption "is marked by immorality and perversion; [the
corrupt person] is depraved; venal; dishonest.' l2 Corruption, other con-
temporary analysts of political corruption write, is the "scarlet thread of
bribery" and other acts in the "jungle of nepotism and temptation."13
In short, the articulation of public duties, understandings of public
interests, and so on might incorporate the underlying moral convictions
that are at stake in corruption cases, or they might not; but it is the power
of the underlying moral notion that makes an allegation of corruption so
powerful. Corruption is not something about which we are ambivalent, or
about which we seek technical definitions or explanations. Corruption is
a moral evil. It is powerful. It is something that threatens political and
legal institutions.
What is this moral evil, that corruption so well identifies? Histori-
cally corruption has been associated with the violation of transcendent
9 See, e.g., JOHN T. NOONAN JR., BRIBES 702-03 (1984) (shame associated with corrupt
actions prevents "briber and bribee from parading their exchange").
10 See, e.g., Arthur Anderson LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 705 (2005) (interpret-
ing 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)) (corruption involves "depraved" or "evil" acts); Heidenheimer, supra
note 6, at 4 (corruption means "depravity," "moral deterioration," and "decay").
11 See, e.g., Edward A. Gargan, Corruption's Many Tentacles Are Choking India's
Growth, N.Y. TIEs (Nov. 10, 1992), http://www.nytimes.com/1992/11/10/world/corruption-
s-many-tentacles-are-choking-india.html (corruption is a "cancer"); Yufan Hao & Michael
Johnston, Corruption and the Future of Economic Reform in China, in POLITICAL CORRUp-
TION: CONCEPTS & CONTEXTS 583, 584 (Arnold J. Heidenheimer & Michael Johnston ed.,
2002) (corruption "'is like a virus invading the body of the party and the state' ") (quoting
former Chinese Communist Party chief Jiang Zemin); Martin Shapiro, Corruption, Freedom
and Equality in Campaign Financing, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 385, 393 (1989) (corruption in the
form of excessive political influence is a "pathology" to be "excised").
12 See Witmer Parker I1, Every Person Has a Price? in CORRUIrON: THE ENEMY
WrrHIN, supra note 8, at 87, 87 (footnote omitted); see also Colin Leys, New States and the
Concept of Corruption, in POLITICAL CORRUPTION: READINGS IN COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS,
supra note 6, at 341, 341 (corruption is an assault on "moral rules").
13 RONALD WRAITH & EDGAR SUIPKINS, CORRUPTION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 11, 13
(1963).
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moral norms, 14 and contemporary academic and popular accounts often
draw upon that idea. 15
When it comes to corruption and government, the best understand-
ing of corruption is somewhat different. Although corruption as a social
and governmental phenomenon can include an individual's engaging in
individually immoral acts, its deeper meaning is rooted in the relation-
ship of the individual to the social fabric of which he or she is a part. The
moral evil that corruption captures is best described as self-involvement,
self-indulgence, and the loosening and discarding of the restraints of so-
cial bonds.
Consider, for instance, a study of a corrupt society in Italy, which
researchers concluded was governed by the ethic of the "amoral
familist," in which "no one will further the interest of the group or com-
munity except as it is to his private advantage to do S0. ' ' 16 Identification
of one's destiny with the destiny of others, beyond the family group, is
missing; in such cultures, "the hope of material gain in the short-run will
be the only motive for concern with public affairs." 17 The inducements
that generally lead people to sacrifice for larger organizational or societal
goals-such as the conviction that one's lot is bound up with others-are
absent. 18 The social and political cohesion necessary for collective life
and voluntary adherence to societal norms is missing; there is an atmos-
phere of societal distrust, and self-seeking, in which each person grabs
for himself or herself or for the small family group or clan to whom the
individual owes loyalty. 19
14 See, e.g., CARL J. FRIEDRICH, THE PATHOLOGY OF POLrrICs: VIOLENCE, BETRAYAL,
CORRUPTION, SECRECY, AND PROPAGANDA 130-31 (1972); J. Peter Euben, Corruption, in Po-
LITICAL INNOVATION AND CONCEPTUAL CHANGE 220, 223-42 (Terence Ball, James Fanr, &
Russell L. Hanson eds., 1989).
15 For instance, Carl Fredrich wrote that corruption has "a religious root, [which] ... is
typically Western and Christian. It harks back to the notion of the two kingdoms . . .. the
earthly and the heavenly city," and the susceptibility of humans to the power of moral deprav-
ity and moral decay. FRIEDRICH, supra note 14, at 128. References to transcendent norms are
often found in the judicial context as well. See, e.g., Bracy v. Gramley, 81 F.3d 684, 700 (7th
Cir. 1986) (Rovner, J., dissenting) (the corrupt judge's "deviation from the path of righteous-
ness was not momentary and uncharacteristic; it was cold, calculated, and spanned a period of
years .... ").
16 Edward C. Banfield, The Moral Basis of a Backward Society, in POLITICAL CORRUP-
TION: READINGS IN COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS, supra note 6, at 129, 129 (emphasis deleted).
17 Id.
18 See id. at 131. See also Jeremy Boissevain, Patronage in Sicily, in POLITICAL CoRRUP-
TION: READINGS IN COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS, supra note 6, at 138, 139 (in heavily patronage-
dependent communities in Sicily, "[t]he central institution of... society is the nuclear fam-
ily"; "[t]he rights and obligations which derive from membership in it provide the individual
with his basic moral code." "Other values and organizational principles are of secondary
importance.").
19 See Robert I. Rotberg, How Corruption Compromises World Peace and Stability, in
CORRUPTION, GLOBAL SECURITY, AND WORLD ORDER, supra note 1, at 1, 4 (discussing how
the moral fabric of any society is rent by corruption); see also Gunnar Myrdal, Corruption: Its
2018]
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Indeed, corruption is insidious not only because it involves the
transgression of norms; it is insidious because it involves the changing
of norms. Generally, the fact that a particular kind of lawbreaking is
common does not result in the serious erosion of the underlying norm.
For instance, when burglary is widespread, we do not generally find that
burglary becomes more acceptable.
However, it is precisely that response that corruption, whether petty
or serious, often provokes. If most people cheat on taxes, it becomes
acceptable to do so. If the acceptance of gifts or "speed money" by offi-
cials is widespread, it becomes acceptable to do so. In a gradual process
of erosion, the reprehensible nature of corrupt acts in the public mind
becomes more and more acceptable. Loyalty to larger, societally protec-
tive ideas-such as belief in the rule of law, for its own sake-fades. It is
replaced by increasing involvement in corrupt activities, lest the actors
miss the benefits of corruption reaped by others. As political scientist
Melanie Manion has written: "what most fundamentally distinguishes
countries with rampant corruption from those where corrupt activities are
unusual is not the content of rules but their relevance .... Moral squea-
mishness about acting corruptly (and illegally) is likely to be little or
great, depending on whether such violations are common or exceptional.
If public officials and ordinary citizens obtain their information about
social values by observing the pattern of transactions around them, then
what is normal (in a descriptive sense) may become acceptable (in a
moral sense)."20
There are many costs that corruption imposes on societies and gov-
ernments. Many studies have demonstrated that corruption involves di-
version of public moneys or other government assets to private
individuals, resulting in the waste or theft of public resources;21 ruins
government efficiency, as officials demand bribes to perform their du-
ties;22 cripples the implementation of merit systems in public employ-
ment;23 and enriches the privileged at the expense of the poor and
Causes and Effects, in POLITICAL CORRUPTION: READINGS IN COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS, supra
note 6, at 238 (corruption involves "stronger loyalty to less inclusive groups-family, caste,
ethnic, religious, or linguistic community... and class," rather than to the larger community).
20 MELANIE MANION, CORRUPTION BY DESIGN: BUILDING CLEAN GOVERNMENT IN MAIN-
LAND CHINA AND HONG KONG 13 (2004).
21 See, e.g., Bayley, supra note 6, at 526; M. McMullan, Corruption in the Public Ser-
vices of British Colonies and Ex-Colonies in West Africa, in PoLmcAL CORRUPrION: READ-
INGS IN COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS, supra note 6, at 317, 318 ("Corruption in the government
involves the ultimate transfer of public funds to the pockets of politicians or officials. The
businessman who has to bribe to get a government contract ultimately charges the bribe to
public funds."). Corrupt procurement practices have been estimated to add a 20 to 100 percent
surcharge in payment for goods and services. See ROBERT KLiTGAARD, CONTROLLING CORRUP-
TION 39 (1988).
22 See KLTGAARD, supra note 21, at 44; Myrdal, supra note 19, at 541.
23 See McMullan, supra note 21, at 317-18.
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disadvantaged. 24 However, perhaps even more profoundly, corruption
destroys the underlying social fabric of trust and identification with
larger public goals upon which the cohesion of societies and govern-
ments depend. Fundamental to the idea of government by law is the as-
surance that publicly enacted rules and regulations are followed by all.
The essence of corruption is the reaping of benefits in a manner that is
contrary to announced rules. Persistent and widespread violation of offi-
cial rules leads to popular cynicism, distrust, and the conviction that the
rule of law has no meaning. 25 "When officials openly and routinely ig-
nore rules about allocation of goods and services requiring their actions,
then the system of order that in theory is backed up by government's
coercive power loses its meaning. Some alternative system of order [-
i.e., corruption-] then exists." '26
The connection between corruption, trust, and internalized moral
norms extends to prescriptions for corruption's cure as well as to its diag-
nosis. Moral norms, internalized by the population, are critical for cor-
ruption's prevention and abatement. Structured institutional strategies-
such as reducing discretion in bureaucratic decision-making, changing
systems of rewards and penalties, and increased monitoring of civil ser-
vants27-are of limited usefulness if attitudes toward societal moral val-
ues remain unchanged.28 Syed Hussein Alatas, a keen observer of corrupt
societies, has leveled trenchant criticism at those whom he calls "struc-
turalists," who attribute the existence of corruption to external causes
such as the legacy of colonial rule and the rise of bureaucratic govern-
ment. The problem, he writes, is one of moral values constraining the
self-seeking nature of human beings. 29 Robert Rotberg, who has long
studied corrupt societies, agrees. "Corruption begets more corruption....
[There is a] natural human tendency to put self-interest over national
interest and emulation over conscience." "[I]t is only from the establish-
ment of political cultures that enshrine values antithetical to corruption
that effective institutions of accountability and oversight emerge." '30
24 See KLrrGAARD, supra note 21, at 41.
25 See, e.g., Bayley, supra note 6, at 527 ("Corruption in government, perceived by the
people, lowers respect for constituted authority [and] . . . undercuts popular faith in govern-
ment to deal evenhandedly.").
26 MANION, supra note 20, at 4.
27 See generally KLrrGAARD, supra note 21, at 74-95 (discussing various general poli-
cies for reducing corruption, and their various weaknesses).
28 See id. at 90-97.
29 See SYED HUSSEIN ALATAS, CORRUPTION: ITS NATURE, CAUSES, AND FUNCTIONS 122
(1990).
30 Robert I. Rotberg, Leadership Alters Corrupt Behavior, in CORRUPrION, GLOB. SEC. &
WORLD ORDER, supra note 1, at 343, 350. See also Michel Cahen, Nationalism and Ethnici-
ties: Lessons from Mozambique, in ETHNIcrrv KILLs? THE PoLmcs OF WAR, PEACE, AND
ETHNICrY IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 163, 163 (Einar Braathen, Morten Boas, & Gjermund
Saether eds., 2000); Alan Doig & Stephen Riley, Corruption and Anti-Corruption Strategies:
2018]
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Corruption presents an alternative moral system which reinforces
individual self-seeking in derogation of societal trust, societal identifica-
tion, and the constraints of moral norms. It thrives as previously existing
social and moral constraints are discarded by the populace in favor of
short-term grabbing and the pursuit of material gain by individuals for
themselves, their families, and clans. Because of this character, corrup-
tion can be particularly problematic in situations involving regime
change, democratization efforts, and the establishment of market-based
reforms.
II. CORRUPTION, MARKET SYSTEMS, AND NEOLIBERAL
POLITICAL REFORM
As noted above, links between corruption and regime change have
been drawn by many observers.31 Of particular interest has been the
counterintuitive observation that democratic reforms-instituted in re-
sponse to popular outrage-often seem to intensify corruption as they
progress. Even though the ultimate governmental outcome-for instance,
the adoption of a democratic system, with a free press and an indepen-
dent judiciary-might "engender powerful antibodies against corrup-
tion, ' 32 corruption will often intensify in the short or medium term.33
Of course, there is no guarantee that democratic or neoliberal politi-
cal reforms will be "curative" of corruption in any setting. As Michael
Johnston observes, although democratic strategies such as "[c]hecks and
balances, accountable leaders, liberal markets, competitive elections, and
administrative transparency" are associated with countries where corrup-
Issues and Case Studies from Developing Countries, in CORRUPTION & INTEGRITY IMPROVE-
MENT INrxAnVES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRImS, supra note 1, at 45, 50-55.
One of the most interesting examples of this insight is the successful anti-corruption ef-
fort undertaken in Hong Kong. Along with structural institutional changes, anticorruption ef-
forts included educational campaigns to change underlying norms. "From the outset," Melanie
Manion writes, "the governor [of Hong Kong] recognized that the success of the anticorruption
effort could not rely on enforcement and prevention alone ... [It was recognized that officials
must] 'educate the public against the evils of corruption' and 'enlist ... public support' in
fighting corruption." Fostering social disapproval of corrupt activities included moral educa-
tion, in an effort to change private values. The goal was to create a belief among the people
"'that [the corrupt] ... and their kind are unacceptable in decent society, that they are without
honour and are not wanted in Hong Kong."' MANION, supra note 20, at 43, 48 (quoting INDE-
PENDENT COMMISSION AGAINST CORRUPTION, ANNUAL REPORT BY THE COMMISSIONER OF THE
INDEPENDENT COMMISSION AGAINST CORRUPTION 8 (1977)).
31 See generally sources cited supra note 1 and accompanying text. For studies that asso-
ciate corruption with political stability and regime change, see, e.g., Michael Nacht, Internal
Change and Regime Stability, in ADELPHi PAPERS No. 166: THIRD-WORLD CONFLICT AND
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 52 (1981); KLITGAARD, supra note 21, at 45-46; McMullan, supra
note 21, at 318; Sinnathamby Rajaratnam, Bureaucracy versus Kleptocracy, in POLTICAL
CORRUPTION: READINGS IN COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS, supra note 6, at 546, 546-48.
32 See Glynn et al., supra note 1, at 11.
33 See, e.g., id.; Elliott, supra note 1, at 198.
MAINTENANCE OF GOVERNMENT
tion is the exception rather than the rule, "[i]t does not follow ...that
putting [such factors] in place will control the problem. ' 34 One could
simply believe that in the particular cases involving regime change and
increased corruption, democratic/neo-liberal reforms simply failed (for
whatever reason) to cure the pre-existing problem.
However, the stakes are such that most analysts have probed more
deeply. Democratic and market reforms might fail-but in these cases
there is, at least arguably, more than failure. Corruption in these cases
does not simply continue; it seems to worsen with the implementation of
reforms. To what might this phenomenon be attributed?
Some observers stress explanations that are rooted in the general
conditions that regime change presents. Typical explanations for corrup-
tion's increase during such times include the weakening of legal and po-
litical (even authoritarian) controlling institutions, the suspension of
resources for corruption-fighting efforts, and greater opportunities for
corruption as the result of bureaucratic breakdown and governmental au-
thority being up for grabs. 35
There is another characteristic of conditions during times of regime
change that adds powerfully to the toxic milieu in which corruption
thrives. As described above, the existence of corruption in a particular
society is directly related to the degree of anticorruption norm-internal-
ization and adherence among citizens. Although it is conceivable that the
turbulence of regime change will strengthen moral standards, it is more
likely that it will destabilize existing norms. In an atmosphere of uncer-
tainty and rejection of the prior governmental order, individuals will be
adrift as new normative pronouncements replace the old and new ideas
replace what were contrary (if often flawed) social and cultural commit-
ments. In an atmosphere of uncertainty and a rejection of the prior social
order, there is often little to inhibit the grasping impulse to participate in
spoils that-it is believed-others are extorting.
The association of societal-norm breakdown with the growth of cor-
ruption has been observed in the modernization of traditional societies, 36
the experience of post-colonial societies,3 7 and post-socialist transi-
34 MICHAEL JOHNSTON, SYNDROMES OF CORRUPTION: WEALTH, POWER, AND DEMOC-
RACY 22 (2005).
35 See, e.g., Elliott, supra note 1, at 198; Glynn et al., supra note 1, at 8, 10; Robert
Legvold, Corruption, the Criminalized State, and Post-Soviet Transitions, in CORRUPTION,
GLOB. SEC. & WORLD ORDER, supra note 1, at 194, 201-02; Szeftel, supra note 6, at 163.
36 See, e.g., Charlick, supra note 1, at 183; Sarah Dix & Emmanuel Pok, Combating
Corruption in Traditional Societies: Papau New Guinea, in CORRUPTION, GLOB. SEC. &
WORLD ORDER, supra note 1, at 239; Nick Smart, Classes, Clients and Corruption in Sicily, in
CORRUPTION: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND CONTROL, supra note 6, at 127, 132-34.
37 See, e.g., USAID, FIGHTING CORRUPTION AND RESTORING ACCOUNTABILITY IN
BURUNDI (2006); Rose-Ackerman, supra note 1; Stasavage, supra note 1, at 65-66, 85-86;
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tions.38 Conditions in post-Soviet Russia, Robert Legvold observes, were
the product of corrupt practices under the prior Soviet regime and its
subsequent collapse. In the Soviet Union, corruption flourished due to
conditions of "scarcity and clientelism, . . combined with the moral de-
cay arising from the long-lost ideological idealism." "Hence, the Soviet
Union provided a base for the criminalized state, but not its essence. That
required the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the chaotic transition from
one economic order to another."' 39 Similar dynamics have been observed
in contemporary Nigeria. Corruption in that country has been strongly
identified with the transition from a traditional moral economy, in which
reciprocity, kinship, and personal allegiance dictated forms of sociability
and social obligation, to one governed by the ethos of a neoliberal,
postcolonial governmental system.40 In the resulting confusion between
traditional and neoliberal moral codes, "Nigerians sense that their state
and society have become increasingly amoral-with elites pursuing
wealth and power without regard for the consequences, and ordinary
people seeking money by all means available. 41
The role of ethical confusion in regime-change corruption is well
described by political sociologist Claus Offe "[t]he characteristic weak-
ness of the functioning of post-authoritarian new democracies," he
writes, "is often analyzed to be the scarcity of [inter-personal trust] and
the prevalence of [ethical] cynicism.... ." New regimes often "consist of
an incoherent patchwork of old and new rules without any evident under-
lying principle. The widely publicized and highly visible experience of
corruption [and] ... contested domains... [reflects the] failure to gener-
ate credible commitments to any meaningful Gestalt of principles, ideas,
and [institutional] functions .... "42
Daniel Jordan Smith, The Paradoxes of Popular Participation in Corruption in Nigeria, in
CORRUPTION, GLOB. SEC. & WORLD ORDER, supra note 1, at 283, 287-306.
38 See, e.g., JOHNSTON, supra note 34, at 195-99; Legvold, supra note 35, at 195-96;
Ewa Letowska, Corruption: Towards Greater Transparency? paper cited in Alexandra Mills,
Strengthening Domestic Institutions against Corruption: A Public Ethics Checklist, in COR-
RUPTION & INTEGRITY IMPROVEMENT INITIATIVES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, supra note 1, at
141, 142; Kim Lane Scheppele, The Inevitable Corruption of Transition, 14 CONN. J. INT'L L.
509, 514-16 (1999).
39 Legvold, supra note 35, at 204.
40 See Smith, supra note 37, at 305-06.
41 Id. at 305.
42 Claus Offe, How Can We Trust Our Fellow Citizens?, in DEMOCRACY & TRUST 42,
77-78 (Mark E. Warren ed., 1999). Similar dynamics have been observed in post-Maoist
China. Corruption was certainly prevalent in China prior to that time; but the end of the Maoist
era was accompanied by a "'fantastic increase"' in corrupt irregularities, "as well as the emer-
gence and growth of new forms of corruption." MANION, supra note 20, at 94-95 (quoting
Wojtek Zafanolli, A Brief Outline of China's Second Economy, in TRANSFORMING CHINA'S
ECONOMY IN THE EIGHTIES, Vol. 2, MGMT., INDUS., & URBAN ECON. 138, 139 (Stephen
Feuchtwang, Athar Hussain, & Thierry Pairault eds., 1988). Attempts to curb corruption dur-
ing this time by exhorting moral standards were made difficult by confusion over changing
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This situation can be aggravated by the common complimentary ob-
jective of democratic reform: the move to a market-based economic sys-
tem. The reasoning here is straightforward. Democratic reforms and the
implementation of a market system are generally linked in the West, with
the idea that they are mutually reinforcing phenomena. Free elections,
majoritarian democratic control, judicial independence, a free press, and
other hallmarks of a liberal democratic system are premised upon a
model of individual consent and autonomous choice, and a free market
reinforces and encourages this ethos. In the liberal democratic model,
individuals (in the aggregate) should determine what their government
should be, and should be protected-in important ways-from the tyr-
anny of government. This foundational value of individual freedom and
autonomy is reified by the existence of a free market economy, through
which individuals can express their preferences and life goals in a way
that is most important in their lives. An ethos of freedom in one sphere
requires the aspiration of an ethos of freedom in the other.
This may indeed be true, as an abstract matter; however, a discon-
certing observation about the effects of the move to a market economy in
times of regime change has been made. In many important instances, the
transition to market capitalism has been associated with increased cor-
ruption.43 This is counterintuitive, in view of the fact that free market
reforms are often reforms that decrease bureaucratic red tape and other
opportunities for the exaction of corrupt payments. a Why would such
reforms be associated with an increase in personal and governmental
corruption?
In the traditional literature, reasons advanced for the link between
market-economic transition and corruption have focused on the under-
development of complimentary institutions. 45 Just as in discussions of
corruption during regime change as a general matter, it is pointed out that
market-based transitions during times of regime change are made when
policing and law-enforcement controls are weak. That atmosphere, to-
values, and the resulting "lower psychic costs for officials choosing to engage in corruption."
Id. at 94. See also Yan Sun, The Chinese Protests of 1989: The Issue of Corruption, 31 ASIAN
SURVEY 762, 772 (1991).
43 See, e.g., Doig & Riley, supra note 30, at 54; Alan Doig & Robin Theobald, Introduc-
tion: Why Corruption?, to CORRUPTION AND DEMOCRATISATION, supra note 1, at 1, 7; Elliott,
supra note 1, at 198, 208-09; Barbara Harriss-White & Gordon White, Corruption, Liberaliza-
tion and Democracy, 27 IDS BULL. 1, 2-3 (1996); JOHNSTON, supra note 34, at 9; Kaufmann,
supra note 1, at 72; Rose-Ackerman, supra note 1, at 77-78; Stasavage, supra note 1, at
69-70, 85-86; Hartmut Schweitzer, Corruption: Its Spread and Decline, in THE NEW INSTITU-
TIONAL ECONOMICS OF CORRUPTION 16, 34-35 (Johann Graf Lansdorff, Markus Tauber, &
Matthias Schramm eds., 2005).
44 See Elliott, supra note 1, at 208; Doig & Riley, supra note 30, at 50 ("For developing
countries, [a] . . . consensus suggests that democratisation, public sector 'downsizing' and
deregulation are ... a useful means to reduce ... corruption.").
45 See, e.g., Elliott, supra note 1, at 198; Kaufmann, supra note 1, at 72-73.
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gether with the new opportunities for corruption that a market economy
can present, are theorized to create the conditions for increased
corruption.46
Such explanations undoubtedly identify important factors that can
foster the growth of corruption in any setting. The question that I will
explore here is different. It is this: Is there anything that is intrinsic to the
market model that can, uniquely, encourage a corrupt ethos?
This is a difficult question. However, there is important evidence
that promotion of a market system-whatever its economic promise-
can undermine the values that are important in the containment of cor-
ruption. This is particularly true when a market ethos is suddenly insti-
tuted under conditions of regime change, in which-almost invariably-
the fundamental values of a society are in disarray.
As noted above, corruption-as a general matter-involves the
privileging of self-involvement, self-indulgence, and the discarding of
the restraints of social bonds. The essence of corruption is the replace-
ment of societal identification and restraints by an atmosphere of intense
distrust, in which individuals grab for themselves or for the small group
to which they owe loyalty.47 Formal rules that are supposed to generate
social-welfare goods-including justice, long-term goals, and some mea-
sure of equal opportunity-lose their legitimacy, as they have little or no
relevance to the successful pursuit of individual advantage. 48 As Peter
Euben has written, "corruption is a disease of the body politic. It has less
to do with individual malfeasance than with systematic and systemic de-
generation of those practices and commitments that provide the terms of
collective self-understanding and shared purpose." 49
Enter, at this point, the ethos of markets. In its rawest or most primi-
tive form, market capitalism encourages unrestrained competition and in-
dividual gain as the foundational values and over-arching objectives of
both individual and collective life. Individuals succeed when-through
intelligence, initiative, craft, and even ruthlessness-they outwit others
in the competition for resources and advantage. The triumph of a market
ethos in a society threatened by corruption can be easily seen by the
populace as underscoring the irrelevance of contrary public ideas and
commitments, and reinforcing the ethic of individual grabbing that gov-
ernmental chaos and the growth of corrupt forces have produced.
In contemporary China, for instance, it has been argued that the rise
of market capitalism intensified the "crisis of values" produced by the
46 See Robert Leiken, Controlling the Global Corruption Epidemic, 105 FoREIGN POL'Y
55, 68, 72 (1996); Kaufmann, supra note 1, at 72-73; Elliott, supra note 1, at 209.
47 See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text.
48 See JOHNSTON, supra note 34, at 36-48.
49 Euben, supra note 14, at 222-23.
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collapse of the prior Maoist regime.50 Rejection of the prior Maoist eco-
nomic policy transformed the normative environment, and "Maoist rhet-
oric of economic equality [was replaced] with a 'trickle-down' economic
strategy that unabashedly encouraged some to get rich first (and others
later). ' ' 51 "Official corruption ... contributed to the deepening moral
vacuum and cynicism felt by many ordinary Chinese when making
money is paramount. ' 52 "In the post-Cultural Revolution context, the
'transformation of economic ethics [was] nothing short of astonish-
ing . . . .' [There was] a 'general blurring of boundaries between legiti-
mate and illegitimate economic and social behavior and . . . an
increasing sense of normlessness."' In the new normative climate, those
"who chose to engage in corruption had less cause for moral qualms
about it.''53
Market transitions in other countries have been associated with sim-
ilar phenomena. In Mozambique, for example, corruption spread rapidly
with the abrupt shift from socialism to capitalism in 1987. Commentators
have observed that concurrently with this shift, corruption became ac-
ceptable in a way that it was not ten years before. 54 Identified reasons
include the installation of "a particularly unbridled form of capitalism"
that legitimated an ethos of unrestrained self-seeking to get ahead.55 In
the former Soviet bloc countries, it has been observed that the public
sphere was something that was neither cultivated nor respected by the
citizenry during the socialist years. 56 With the transition to a market
economy, identification with public values became even more uncer-
tain.57 The interpersonal norms of a market system did not present a
compelling, competing ideology to individual self-seeking; if anything,
they appeared (from the popular point of view) to institutionalize it.58
The existence of a market system is not necessarily incompatible
with the existence of a robust public ethic, with which the populace
clearly identifies; indeed, in many countries, markets function concur-
rently with strong public identification and widely accepted public-goods
objectives. In these cases, it is accepted that public norms and institutions
50 See JOHNSTON, supra note 34, at 162.
51 MANION, supra note 20, at 94.
52 Jim Yardley, The Chinese Go After Corruption, Corruptly, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 22,
2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/22/weekinreview/22yardley.html?mtrref=www.bing
.com.
53 MANION, supra note 20, at 94-95 (quoting He Qinglian, ZHONOGUO DE XIANJING
[China's Pitfall] 195 (1997), and ANDREW J. NATHAN, CHINA'S CRISIS: DILEMMAS OF REFORM
AND PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY 108 (1990)) (footnotes omitted).
54 See Stasavage, supra note 1, at 85.
55 See id. at 86.
56 See Scheppele, supra note 38, at 516.
57 See id. at 521-22.
58 See id.
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both support and restrain the operation of markets.59 On the supportive
side, public laws enforce market contracts and provide venues for dispute
resolution. On the restraining side, public laws establish standards for
fair play, and are concerned with distributional issues of societal wealth
and power.60 The difference is that in these cases, there are concurrently
existing, robust public ideals and institutions which citizens believe are
as important to the quality of their lives as the self-seeking, individualis-
tic ethic of the capitalist market system.
The tension between an individualistic (market) ethos and the main-
tenance of public or other-regarding ideals is aptly described by Michael
Johnston. "Liberal political and economic processes," he writes: "are
asymmetrical in significant ways. Democratic politics rests not only on
open competition, but also on normative assumptions about equality and
fair play .... Self-interest generally drives the process, but contention
among such interests must stay within certain boundaries .... Markets,
by contrast, incorporate few presumptions of equality, in process or out-
come .... Gains are presumed to be private and separable, rather than
public and aggregated. '61 If the line between public norms and private
norms fades, or if market ideas fill a vacuum left by discredited public
institutions, the result can be unrestrained self-seeking and competition
for spoils. "If politics has become a mere extension of markets-or if a
substantial proportion of people believe that it has-the system risks los-
ing the trust of citizens and its ability to ... make legitimate, genuinely
public policies." "[T]he opportunities and guarantees supposedly pro-
vided to citizens" by collective agreement become a simple question of
supply and demand, dictated only by wealth and power.
62
For implementation of a capitalist market system to work together
with liberal democratic ideals, there must be "[c]lear and accepted
boundaries and distinctions .. . between state and society; public and
private roles and resources; [and] personal and collective inter-
ests ... ,"63 In a noncorrupt governmental order, certain societal norms
and public goods are placed beyond the ethos of individual determina-
tion, competition, and grabbing. It is when the lines between public inter-
ests and unrestrained self-seeking are blurred that there is an acceleration
of descent into a corrupt spiral.
It has been stated that "corruption essentially privatizes moral life."
In a corrupt society, "[s]ocial relations are dominated by self-interest....
59 See JOHNSTON, supra note 34, at 9; Michael Johnston & Yufan Hao, China's Surge of
Corruption, 6 J. DEMOCRACY 80, 89-90 (1995).
60 See JOHNSTON, supra note 34, at 9.
61 Id. at 8.
62 Id. at 73.
63 Id. at 9.
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[C]ivic virtue and social responsibility are displaced and discarded in
favour of an intense competition for spoils."64 The introduction of a mar-
ket system is not necessarily destructive of the idea of a public weal or
public interest; indeed, in many countries, the two operate in an inte-
grated manner, governing intertwined areas of human life. The problem
occurs when-for whatever reason-the identification of citizens with
the public weal is weak. In such cases, corruption-or unbridled self-
seeking, in defiance of common interests-can be fueled by the intrinsic,
self-interested core of the market model.
III. CODA: SUSTAINING LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT
Corruption is a uniquely valuable lens through which the establish-
ment and maintenance of liberal democratic government can be under-
stood. Because corruption and government are deeply intertwined-
because corruption is universally acknowledged to undermine govern-
ment-what corruption is, and why it has this power, are illuminative of
deep issues before us.
Controlling unbridled self-seeking, in a context of duties to others,
is a fundamental issue in civic life and in the maintenance of govern-
ment. Self-seeking is a part of human nature; indeed, without self-seek-
ing, in the forms of appropriation of the means for living and the
protection of one's offspring, human life would cease. The goal is not to
"eliminate" self-seeking; it is to control it and channel it within the con-
struction of a broader social fabric.
Corruption is an idea that captures the failure of that process. Cor-
ruption represents the triumph of the ethic of individual self-involve-
ment, self-indulgence, and the loosening and discarding of the restraints
of social bonds. It is no accident that corruption is universally framed in
moral terms. When individuals act corruptly, they pursue self-interested
grabbing in disregard of the restraints (the "moral" restraints) that the
society has established for its self-preservation. Social bonds, and the
institutions that social bonds have created, are profoundly threatened by
this process.
Corruption, thus, threatens existing governments. It also undermines
transitions to "other" forms of government, including those that are be-
lieved to be a anti-corrupt or "more democratic" than pre-existing re-
gimes. Because corruption is the rejection and subordination of societal
obligations to individual impulses of self-seeking, it is also the manifes-
tation of citizen alienation and rejection of social controls through gov-
ernment. It is also the manifestation of citizen perception that social
controls-through the process of political upheaval or otherwise-lost
64 Williams, supra note 7, at 504.
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the power to control the behavior of others. Corruption reflects the per-.
ception of a moral vacuum, which allows individuals to rationalize their
yielding to the power of individual self-seeking.
In settings where the identification of citizens with the public weal
is weak, corruption-or unbridled self-seeking-can be fueled by the
self-interested ethos of the market norm. Markets celebrate the private
and the individual, not the public and the aggregated. Whether for good
or for ill, the essential message of a free-market system-as a raw idea,
or in its prototypical form-is that individual monetary self-seeking is
good; in fact, it is supreme; and that all of the hallmarks of individual
success in life-happiness, individual security, envy by others-are
achieved through individual self-seeking and its fruits. In their more so-
phisticated forms, of course, market systems reflect refinements and
qualifications to this idea, represented by social regulation, "fairness" in
bargains, and so on. But these are often internalized as quite secondary to
the legitimation and reification of self-interested seeking that a "free-
market" system supplies. If a man on the street in this country were
asked, "which do you associate with a free market system-going after
you want, or social controls?", it would be a shocking poll indeed if it
were to find that a majority of citizens identified the latter.
How is it, then, that so many liberal democratic countries seem to
operate successfully with both free-market systems and strong public
cultures and laws? Whatever the aggravation of corrupt or self-interested
behavior that a free market system intrinsically encourages, it does not
seem to seriously undermine the functioning of a robust public order in
those countries. Individualistic impulses and collective objectives seem
to coexist in a kind of equipoise, or-perhaps more accurately-collec-
tive objectives are internalized by individuals as a part of their individual
goals. It is only in cases of governmental instability-such as those in-
volving regime change, or radical movement from a non-market to a
market system-that the self-interested ethos of a market system seems
to present serious dangers to the existence of a restraining social order.
As a result, we might believe that there is a lesson in this phenomenon
for post-colonial societies, or post-communist societies, or other such so-
cieties that are in the process of governmental and economic transition-
but there is no perceptible lesson in it for us.
In my view, adopting such a view would be dangerously naive.
Maintenance of the conditions necessary for a liberal democratic govern-
mental order-in which there is widespread belief and support for public
institutions-is a much more difficult and tenuous enterprise than those
of us who live in such environments want to admit. We are unaware of
the need for this kind of foundational public commitment precisely be-
cause it is there. Democratic elections, a free press, the rule of law, and
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the rest of the machinery of liberal democratic government mean little if
there is no underlying commitment to basic values that restrain individ-
ual self-seeking in service of the larger communities of which we are a
part. Indeed, current politics in the United States which exploit feelings
of alienation, racial and ethnic hostility, and anger at those community
members who exhibit difference are testaments to the fragility of the as-
sumed social and political detente that underlies our liberal democratic
order.
Thirty years ago, as a student at Yale University, I met the then-
President of Argentina, Raoul Alfonsin. He was lawyer and teacher who
dedicated his scholarly efforts and later his political career to the cause of
the establishment of liberal democratic government. At the time that I
met him, he had attempted to function for three years as Argentina's first
democratically elected president after decades of military government,
political corruption, and state-sponsored murder. As he sat with his body-
guards, he was asked how his work in Argentina was progressing. I will
never forget his answer. The substance of it was this: "It is very difficult
to maintain democratic government if the underlying values of a society
have decayed."
Those of us who live in liberal democratic countries might believe
that we are immune from a need to worry about the maintenance of un-
derlying social identification and foundational moral norms. We might
believe that the mechanics of citizen voting and the fruits of a market
system will surely do it-that they will guarantee the maintenance of a
genuinely liberal democratic government for ourselves and for our chil-
dren. If we believe this, we should think again. We are not immune from
the lessons of human history. We enjoy what we enjoy only because of
the underlying values that constrain the self-seeking that our system oth-
erwise allows.
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